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Abstract
Protecting organizational information assets is an
essential objective for most organizations. More than
ever, information security relies on insiders with
access to information in their work. This research
integrates regulatory focus theory with rational choice
theory to help shed light on these insiders’ motivations
to protect organizational information. The result of
these exploratory analyses indicates that promotion
and prevention foci each distinctly relate to perceived
costs and benefits of protecting organizational
information assets. Additionally, the findings show
that the overall benefit of protecting mediates an
expanded set of costs and benefits. Ultimately, the
model explains 57.1% of the variance in insiders’
intentions to protect organizational information
assets.

1. Introduction
Protecting sensitive information and information
systems (IS) is a crucial task for many organizations.
Today, organizational insiders (or simply insiders)
have new responsibilities to ensure the security of
organizational information and IS [5]. These insiders
are all agents of the firm with access to information
and IS [38]. Because insiders are entrusted with
organizational information to complete any of a
number of job roles and work-related tasks, their
behaviors with this information are of paramount
importance for information security [37, 12, 16].
Therefore, understanding how insiders make securityrelated decisions becomes an essential goal of IS
security researchers [32].
Many theoretical perspectives have been examined
to help understand insider security-related behavior.
Underlying many of these prior studies [e.g., 43, 4, 47,
10] are the mechanisms by which individuals weigh
the consequences of their decisions. One theory that
helps explain human decision-making is rational
choice theory (RCT) [13]. RCT’s core philosophy is
somewhat simple: people are utility seeking agents
that make decisions based on their evaluation of the
benefits and costs of their choices [4]. Essentially, this
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means that individuals weigh the benefits and the costs
associated with behavior when forming their
intentions [39].
As exhibited by the large body of literature, based,
at least in part, on rational choice theory, calculating
costs and benefits of security-related behavior can be
influenced by many factors. For example, several
studies have considered the influence of
organizational sanctions [e.g., 25, 15], security threat
severity [e.g., 26, 6, 42], and both negative and
positive emotional reactions to confronting security
threats [e.g., 8, 14, 21].
Despite these significant advances in our
understanding of insiders’ security-related behaviors,
researchers continue to call for broader theoretical
consideration of these issues [48, 32, 27, 36].
Additionally, much of the prior research has examined
RCT in the context of policy compliance [e.g., 4].
While this is an important area or investigation for IS
security, research indicates that the motives to comply
and protect are distinct [7]. Thus, we contend that a
candidate for further theoretical extension of rational
choices and security-related behavior is integration
with regulatory focus theory (RFT) [19] to examine
motivations to protect organizational information
assets.
Although RFT has been examined by behavioral
and organizational theorists across many contexts, it
has not been widely studied in the context of
information security [30]. RFT posits that individuals’
motivations can be explained by their promotion or
prevention focus [19]. The lack of security research
investigating RFT is somewhat surprising given that a
significant body of literature deals with both
preventing [15, 13, 44] and promoting [37, 6, 3]
various security-related behaviors and organizational
outcomes.
Given this opportunity, we set out to perform an
initial exploration of the relationship of regulatory
focus, rational choices (i.e., perceptions of the costs
and benefits), and intentions to protect organizational
information assets. Distinct from the compliance
intentions in prior RCT research [e.g., 4], intentions to
protect go beyond “explicitly defined responsibilities
incorporating extra-role behaviors that are not
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associated with rewards for performance
punishments for inaction” [7, p. 1192].

or

2. Theoretical Background
As noted, this research seeks to integrate two wellestablished theories of rational choices (i.e., RCT [4])
and regulatory focus (i.e., RFT [19]). RCT explains
that individuals consider the benefits and costs of a
course of action to determine their behavior [4]. RFT
posits that individuals’ motivations can further be
explained by their promotion or prevention focus [19].
We contend that these theories are complementary
because the emphasis on promotion or prevention
likely influences the perceptions of costs and benefits
associated with a behavior. For example, prior
research distinguishes motivations to protect from
motivations to comply [7]. Similarly, the drive to
proactively protect the firm from security threats may
be distinct from that to prevent a lapse in security.
Thus, a prevention-oriented focus might influence
perceptions of costs, while a promotion-oriented focus
might influence perceptions of benefits.
Next, we provide a more detailed background into
our focal theories. Figure 2 exhibits our research
model and the theoretical integration of RCT and RFT.

2.1 Rational Choice Theory
RCT reflects an individual’s perceptions of the
balance between the costs and benefits of a course of
action [4]. At its core, RCT seeks to explain decision
making of so-called "rational” actors that choose a
utility-maximizing course of action [1]. Indeed,
because it accounts for benefits and costs, RCT has
been widely applied in economics and provides the
underlying mechanism for many models of
consumption [17]. As a behavioral choice model, RCT
has been commonly used in criminology to help
explain the criminal decision-making process [32].
Drawing mainly on its criminology roots, IS
security researchers have also employed RCT to
understand security policy compliance [4, 10]. For
example, Bulgurcu et al. [4] examined the benefit of
compliance, cost of compliance, and cost of noncompliance with IS security policies to explain policy
compliance. Others have used a general measure of
cost-benefit to explain compliance decisions [e.g., 36].

2.2. Regulatory Focus Theory
Regulatory focus theory posits that individuals'
motivations can be explained by their promotion or
prevention focus [19]. Promotion focus relates to

gains, ideals, and accomplishment, and prevention
focus refers to duties, obligations, and security [22].
Thus, promotion focus reflects achievement-oriented
motivation, while prevention focus reflects an
avoidance-oriented basis [22]. Depending on the
organizational or personal objective, promotion or
prevention focus might provide a more effective
motivational stimulus [28, 41]. For example, a
prevention focus often leads to conservative choices,
while promotion focus is linked to riskier options [2].
Interestingly, regulatory focus is at once a
lingering personality characteristic and a temporary
state [22]. Despite the clear relevance for IS security
stemming from the two regulatory approaches,
relatively little research has examined RFT and IS
security-related behavior. A notable exception is
research showing regulatory focus moderates the role
of punishments (prevention focus) and rewards
(promotion focus) on insiders' ISP compliance [30].
Given that both RFT and RCT distinguish between
benefits (achievement orientation) and costs
(avoidance orientation), we contend that a natural
extension of these seminal theories is to consider them
together.

3. Hypotheses
Next, we briefly discuss our hypotheses. Adapting
and extending the prior work of Bulgurcu et al. [4], we
conceptualize four distinct benefits and costs to
protecting the information assets: (1) cost of
protecting, (2) benefit of protecting, (3) cost of not
protecting, and finally (4) benefit of not protecting.
While the first of these were adapted directly from the
prior work, the fourth, the benefit of not protecting, is
novel to this study. Because this is an exploratory
work, we are interested in distinguishing the influence
of promotion and prevention foci on the various costs
and benefits of protecting information assets. We are
also the first to formally examine how individual costs
and benefits of protecting organizational assets
influence the overall benefit of protecting
organizational information.

3.1. Promotion Focus on Benefits and Costs
Promotion focus is oriented toward achievement.
Promotion-focused individuals typically employ an
eagerness strategy framed around the potential for
gains [41]. However, this reality is complicated
because some perceived costs result in a security
benefit. For example, the cost of not protecting works
counter to not protecting (i.e., it is a motivational force
that counteracts harmful security behaviors), whereas
the cost of protecting works as a disincentive to
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protecting (i.e., it is a motivational force that enhances
harmful security behaviors). Figure 1 exhibits the
relationship between the various costs/benefits, and
their association with an increase/decrease in
organizational security.

H1d: Promotion focus will be positively related to
the cost of not protecting.

3.2. Prevention Focus on Benefits and Costs
Prevention focus reflects a motivational tendency
framed around avoidance of losses. These individuals
typically employ a vigilance strategy to preserve status
and avoid losses [41]. As noted above, this is
complicated by costs and benefits that can influence
organizational security differently, depending on the
salience of the goal or outcome. As such, we
hypothesize that prevention focus will also positively
relate to security-enhancing behaviors and negatively
associate with harmful information security behaviors.

Figure 1. Costs, Benefits, and Organizational
Security
At issue is that both regulatory foci are motivational
frames. Thus, a benefit or a cost can depend on the
salience of a higher- or lower-order outcome or goal.
This is similar to the distinction among higher- and
lower-order effects in other theories used in IS
research [7, 9]. We hypothesize that a promotion focus
will be positively related to security-enhancing
behaviors and negatively associated with harmful
information security behaviors.
H1a: Promotion focus will be positively related to
the benefit of protecting.
H1b: Promotion focus will be negatively related to
the benefit of not protecting.
H1c: Promotion focus will be negatively related to
the cost of not protecting.

H2a: Prevention focus will be positively related to
the benefit of protecting.
H2b: Prevention focus will be negatively related to
the benefit of not protecting.
H2c: Prevention focus will be negatively related to
the cost of protecting.
H2d: Prevention focus will be positively related to
cost of not protecting.

3.3. Individual Costs and Benefits on Overall
Benefit of Protecting
Previous researchers have examined the costs and
benefits of RCT in different ways. For example,
Bulgurcu et al. [4] examined individual costs and
benefits, while Moody et al. [36] looked at the overall
benefit or cost. Interestingly, researchers have not yet
clarified the relationship between individual costs and
benefits and the overall cost-benefit balance.
Additionally, when prior researchers examined costs
and benefits separately, the benefit of not performing
the action was excluded [4]. This research gap is
significant because researchers have found that

Benefit of Protecting

Promotion Focus
Benefit of Not
Protecting
Overall Benefit of
Protecting
Organizational
Information Assets
Prevention Focus

H7 (+)

Intentions to Protect
Organizational
Information Assets

Cost of Protecting

Cost of Not
Protecting

Figure 2. Research Model
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motivations exist not to protect one's firm (often
described as maladaptive rewards) [6, 37]. Thus, we
hypothesize that the four unique costs and benefits will
relate to the overall benefit of protecting the
organization.
H3: The benefit of protecting will be positively
related to the overall benefit of protecting
organizational information assets.
H4: The benefit of not protecting will be negatively
related to the overall benefit of protecting
organizational information assets.
H5: The cost of protecting will be negatively
related to the overall benefit of protecting
organizational information assets.
H6: Cost of not protecting will be positively
related to the overall benefit of protecting
organizational information assets.

3.4.
Overall
Benefit
of
Protecting
Organizational Information Assets on
Intentions
to
Protect
Organizational
Information Assets
As explained by RCT, the balance between costs
and benefits helps explain decision making [4]. Thus,
we hypothesize that the overall benefit of protecting
organizational information assets will be positively
related to insiders' intentions to protect these assets.
H7: Overall benefit of protecting organizational
information assets will be positively related to
intentions to protect organizational information
assets

4. Study
To examine the integrated model of RCT and RFT,
we surveyed 295 insiders using an online marketing
research firm. Our sample represents organizational
insiders working in a variety of roles across many

different companies and industries. As recommended
by researchers, we adapted our measures from
previous studies whenever possible [45].
Table 1. Sample Statistics
Female
53.2%
Age
45.25
Tenure
10.21
IT position
14.2%
Management
41.0%
Bachelor's degree
61%
Org Size
Very large
25.1%
(10,000 or more computers)
Large
28.1%
(1,000 to 10,000 computers)
Medium
21.0%
(100 to 1,000 computers)
Small
25.8%
(1 to 100 computers)

4.1. Study Measures
Promotion and prevention were measured using
scales from Higgins et al. [20]. An item for promotion
is “I feel like I have made progress toward being
successful in my life,” and an item for prevention is
"How often did you obey rules and regulations that
were established by your parents?”
The benefits and costs of protecting were measured
using scales adapted from Bulgurcu et al. [4]. In the
original scales, these measures captured the benefits
and costs of compliance. Therefore, we adapted these
measures to our context of protecting organizational
information assets. We also extended this prior work
to include the benefit of not protecting. An example
item of the benefit of protecting is “My protecting the
firm from security threats would be favorable to me.”

Table 2. Construct Statistics
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Benefit Protecting (1)
0.836
Benefit Not Protecting (2)
-0.195 0.887
Cost Not Protecting (3)
0.541 -0.299 0.890
Cost Protecting (4)
-0.048 0.345 -0.143 0.777
Overall Benefit Protecting (5) 0.468 -0.473 0.497 -0.254 0.629
Prevention (6)
0.142 -0.195 0.125 -0.183 0.245
Promotion (7)
0.122 -0.212 0.191 -0.114 0.215
Protection Intention (8)
0.485 -0.409 0.492 -0.172 0.679
CR = Composite Reliability; AVEs on diagonal

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.573
0.095
0.206

0.518
0.216

0.796

CR
0.939
0.959
0.961
0.912
0.834
0.869
0.809
0.921
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Note: Controls explaining “intentions to protect organizational information assets”
R2 without controls = 0.461

Figure 3. Structural Results
An example item for the cost of protection is
“Protecting my firm from information security threats
is burdensome for me.” An item for the cost of not
protecting is “My failure to protect my firm from
information security threats would impact me
negatively.” Finally, our adapted measure for the
benefit of not protecting is “My failure to protect my
firm from information security threats would be
favorable for me.”
The overall benefit of protecting construct was
adapted from Moody et al. [36]. An example item is
“Overall, my benefits from helping to protect my
organization from its information security threats
outweigh the costs.” Finally, the intention to protect
information assets was taken from Posey et al. [37].
An example item is “I intend to protect my
organization from its information security threats.”

5. Analysis and Results
We chose the partial least squares-based structural
equation modeling platform, SmartPLS 3.0 [40] to
perform our analyses. PLS is appropriate for our study
because of the exploratory nature of our work [33]. We
first evaluated the validity of the measures and
subsequently examined our research model.

5.1. Construct Validity
The first criterion we evaluated was the composite
reliabilities of each of the measures in our model. The
composite reliabilities were all above 0.70.
Additionally, all AVEs were above 0.50. Finally, each

pair of constructs met the Fornell-Larker criterion with
AVEs greater than squared correlations for every
construct pair. Table 2 exhibits the construct statistics.

5.2. Structural Results
Next, we evaluated the results of the structural
model. As recommended, we ran the bootstrapping
algorithm with 5,000 samples to achieve our results
[18]. Figure 3 exhibits the structural results. Overall, 9
of the 13 hypothesized relationships were significant
and in the predicted direction. Moreover, the model
explains 57.1% of the variance of intentions to protect
organizational information assets.
The relationships were all in the direction that
increases organizational security (see Figure 1). Thus,
for promotion focus, a positive relationship was found
with the cost of not protecting, while for prevention
focus, a negative association with the cost of
protecting was found. Finally, for both foci, a negative
relationship was found with the benefit of not
protecting.

5.3. Post Hoc Mediation & CMV Analyses
Beyond merely exploring the direct relationships
in the research model, we were also interested in
measuring the indirect and mediated effects present in
the results. For example, it is instructive to see whether
the four distinct costs and benefits relate to intentions
to protect information assets through the overall
benefit of protecting. Second, we also wanted to
examine the significance of the relational path from
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regulatory focus to protection intentions working
through RCT's costs and benefits.
To formally test these indirect effects, the biascontrolled confidence intervals from a bootstrapped
analysis of 5,000 samples were examined [35, 46]. To
formally evaluate mediation, we examined the 95%
confidence interval for each specific indirect effect as
calculated in SmartPLS 3.0. Where the upper and
lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval for the
indirect paths do not contain zero, there is mediation
[34]. Table 3 exhibits significant indirect/mediated
relationships.
Finally, we examined common method variance
(CMV) using the unmeasured latent variable analysis
[11]. The average variance explained by the method
unmeasured latent variable was only 0.54%, providing
evidence that the sample does not suffer from harmful
CMV.

6. Discussion
The overriding goal of this research is to explore
the relationship of RFT and RCT in motivating
insiders’ protection of organizational information
assets. Prior studies have examined both; however,
these previous works did not examine RFT and RCT
in concert. Because of RFT's consideration of
promotion and prevention foci, it is worth
investigating how these orientations influence the
perceptions of the relative costs and benefits of
protecting information assets. This is true because
while promotion and prevention are both motivational
paradigms, they each disparately reflect insiders' focus
on achievement (promotion) or security (prevention)
[31, 41]. Thus, RCT's delineation of costs and benefits
is especially relevant for RFT.
The exploratory study results show that promotion
focus and prevention focus distinctly influence the

perceptions of benefits and costs. Interestingly, we
expected that a promotion focus would be more
oriented toward benefits and a prevention focus more
oriented toward costs. However, as we detail next, our
results tell a more nuanced story.
In terms of the relationship between the facets of
RFT and RCT, two important differences emerge.
First, promotion focus was positively related to the
cost of not protecting and negatively associated with
the benefit of not protecting. This finding was
intriguing because both RCT components relate to not
protecting rather than protecting. Intuitively, we might
have expected promotion focus, with its orientation
around achievement rather than security, to be related
to benefits rather than costs.
Second, prevention focus is negatively associated
with the benefit of not protecting and the cost of
protecting. Again, this is an interesting finding
because we might have expected prevention focus to
be more oriented toward the costs of not protecting.
Instead, we found that prevention focus was most
impactful at reducing the disincentives to protect. In
retrospect, this makes sense because a prevention
focus is oriented toward reducing negatives more than
increasing positives. Interestingly, neither promotion
nor prevention focus showed a significant relationship
with the benefit of protecting. In fact, the benefit of
protecting was the only RCT component that was not
impacted by either regulatory focus orientation.
Additionally, the analyses show that the four costs
and benefits examined were each related to the overall
benefit of protecting information assets. Further, the
mediation test results show that overall benefit can act
as a mediator of specific individual costs and benefits.
The mediation analyses also indicate that both
prevention and promotion have positive indirect
effects on insiders' intentions to protect information
assets. Interestingly, they worked through one benefit

Table 3. Significant Mediation Relationships
Mediation Test
Mediation Relationship
2.5% lower boundi 97.5% upper bound
Individual Costs/Benefits on Protection Intention through Overall Benefit
Benefit of Protecting → Overall Benefit → Protection Intention
0.067
0.189
Benefits of Not Protecting → Overall Benefit → Protection Intention -0.204
-0.095
Cost of Not Protecting → Overall Benefit → Protection Intention
0.047
0.188
Cost of Protecting → Overall Benefit → Protection Intention
-0.092
-0.002
Regulatory Focus on Protection Intention through Individual Costs/Benefits and Overall Benefit
Prevention → Benefit of Not Protecting → Overall Benefit →
0.008
0.045
Protection Intention
Promotion → Benefit of Not Protecting → Overall Benefit →
0.01
0.051
Protection Intention
Promotion → Cost of Not Protecting → Overall Benefit →
0.003
0.047
Protection Intention
iBias-corrected confidence intervals

Mediation?
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
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and one cost: the benefit of not protecting and the cost
of not protecting. Finally, the model explains a
substantial portion of both the overall benefit of
protecting and the intention to protect information
assets.
These results are robust to several demographic
and theoretical controls. As shown in figure 3, we
included eight control variables in the model to
validate our findings. Three controls were significant:
mandatoriness of security behavior, security threat
awareness, and organizational tenure. We included
manditorniess and security threat awareness because
we focused on protection intention beyond formally
prescribed organizational actions [7]. The measures
for mandatoriness were adapted from Boss et al. [3],
and an example item is “My organization requires its
employees to take measures to help protect the
organization's information security.” The measures for
security threat awareness were adapted from Bulgurcu
et al. [4], and an example item is “Thinking about your
current job, to what extent are you aware of the threats
to your organization's information security?”
Therefore, we controlled for insiders' awareness of
security threats and whether they felt participation in
security was mandatory in their organization since
these might influence protection intentions.

6.1. Implications and Contributions
This research makes several significant
contributions to IS security practice and research.
First, our study answers the call for more research into
rational choices [32], and our findings show that
regulatory focus significantly relates to perceptions of
rational choices. The overall perception of benefits
(i.e., benefits vs. costs) subsequently relates to
insiders' intentions to protect organizational
information assets. Next, we consider the specific
implications this research has for IS security practice
and research.
6.1.1. Implications for Practice
These results have implications for information
security practice. This research indicates that
regulatory focus influences choice rationality through
individual costs and benefits. This reality explains
how rational focus can influence information security
outcomes in organizations. A primary focus of much
IS security research is understanding the attractiveness
of beneficial and harmful security behaviors. These
results show that regulatory focus influences the costbenefit calculations of protecting organizational
information assets

In the present study, promotion focus was related
negatively to the perceived benefit of not protecting
and positively to the perceived cost of not protecting.
Thus, insiders with a higher promotion focus calculate
higher costs of not protecting information assets and
lower benefits to not protecting these assets. While
both of these results are positive for information
security, they constitute an interesting finding because
promotion focus is typically expected to be associated
with achievement and gains rather than security and
preventing losses.
On the other hand, prevention focus is related
negatively to the benefit of not protecting and the cost
of protecting. These negative relationships with
disincentives to protect show that a prevention-focus
leads to minimizing losses in security. Thus, as a
motivational frame, these results indicate that
prevention focus reduces the perceptions of
protection-inhibiting costs and benefits (i.e., the
benefit of not protecting and cost of not protecting) but
does not impact the perceptions of protectionenhancing costs and benefits (i.e., the cost of
protecting and benefit of protecting).
Finally, the research shows that while all four costs
and benefits are significantly related to the overall
perception of benefits from protecting information
assets, some have a more substantial influence than
others. For example, the benefit of protecting and the
benefit of not protecting exhibited the strongest
relationship with the overall benefit of protecting
according to the beta coefficient's absolute value. In
contrast, the weakest relationship involving the overall
benefit of protecting was with the cost of protecting.
This finding is intriguing because security
professionals tend to think a major inhibitor of positive
security-related behaviors stems from their perceived
costs in terms of insiders’ time and effort. Based on
these findings, security practitioners can focus their
efforts on amplifying the benefits of protecting and the
costs of not protecting, rather than minimizing the
perceived costs of protecting organizational assets.
In summary, taking insiders’ regulatory focus into
consideration can have beneficial impacts on
information security. As motivational frames, both
foci were related to costs and benefits to protecting
organizational information assets in ways that enhance
security. However, they worked through distinct costs
and benefits. Additionally, we show how distinct costs
and benefits relate to the overall perception of the
benefit of protecting organizational assets, providing
practitioners with a framework for increasing the
protection of organizational information assets.
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6.1.2. Implications for Research
Beyond the practical implications of the research,
our findings also help inform IS security research. For
example, we are among the first to integrate RCT with
RFT to understand how insiders’ regulatory focus
influences protective behaviors' rationality. We show
that regulatory focus influences distinct costs and
benefits. Additionally, the findings indicate that each
cost and benefit is uniquely associated with the overall
benefit of protecting. In fact, the mediation results
indicate that the overall benefit mediates the
relationship between distinct costs/benefits and
protection intention.
These found relationships between regulatory
focus and costs/benefits also underscore another
important theoretical contribution of our study: the
expansion of previous works [e.g., 4] to include the
benefit of not protecting.
Finally, the model explains a substantial portion of
the variance in both the overall benefit of protecting
and intentions to protect organizational information
assets. The model's robust performance indicates that
our research provides a compelling theoretical
extension of RFT and RCT. Notably, previous
research has examined rational choices on compliance
with security policies; however, compliance and
protection are not the same [7]. Thus, these findings
are an important extension of the prior RCT research
beyond policy compliance to the more inclusive goal
of protecting organizational information assets.

6.2. Limitations and Future Research
It should be noted that this research relies on selfreported perceptions and intentions. However, survey
instruments are an accepted medium for ascertaining
insiders' security-related perceptions and intentions [3,
24]. To help counter any weaknesses from selfreported measures, we took recommended precautions
to ensure that individual anonymity was preserved,
and responses were reliable. Future research can
address this shortcoming through experimental
methods or by measuring actual behavior.
Our findings indicate that the overall benefit
mediates distinct costs and benefits. However,
regulatory focus worked distinctly through individual
costs and benefits. Researchers have been mixed on
their use of distinct costs and benefits [e.g., 4] or the
overall balance of cost/benefit [e.g., 36]. Therefore,
future research should continue to investigate both the
overall benefit as well as distinct costs and benefits.
When an overall measure is appropriate, our findings
provide a new overall measure that mediates
individual costs and benefits.

Regulatory focus can be a lingering characteristic
or a temporary state [22]. Prior research indicates that
regulatory focus can be also be influenced [29].
Additionally, researchers have found that regulatory
fit between an individual and a task or environment
can also improve motivation [22]. Finally, research
indicates that regulatory focus is shaped by
environmental cues, including management behavior
and communication [23]. Thus, this type of regulatory
focus activation provides numerous opportunities for
IS security researchers. For example, future research
should employ experimental methods to examine the
activation of regulatory focus and explore the role of
regulatory cues in motivating both protective and
harmful IS-related behaviors. Despite the clear
relevance for IS security, few studies have
investigated RFT in this context [30].

7. Conclusion
This study explored an integrated model of RCT
and RFT. The results indicate that regulatory focus
relates to distinct costs and benefits of protecting
organizational information assets. Specifically, we
found that promotion focus relates negatively to the
benefit of not protecting and positively to the cost of
not protecting, and prevention focus relates negatively
to the benefit of not protecting and the cost of
protecting.
Extending prior works in RCT [4], the model
includes the benefit of not protecting and investigates
intentions to protect organizational assets rather than
intentions to comply with security policies. The results
also show that distinct costs and benefits are mediated
through the perceptions of the overall benefit of
protecting information assets. However, because
regulatory foci disparately impact the individual costs
and benefits, the choice of measuring individual costs
and benefits versus an overall measure depends largely
on the goals of the research.
Finally, the research enumerates important
opportunities for future researchers to expand on the
role of RFT in IS security. Specifically, as a
motivational theory based on prevention and
promotion, future researchers should investigate the
role of regulatory focus on conflicting organizational
goals. For example, some organizational objectives
are probably more likely to be framed through
promotion cues (“make sales”), while other are
probably more likely to be framed with prevention
cues ("avoid security incidents"). This research
indicates that promotion and prevention foci are both
relevant to IS security motivation and intentions.

Page 5235

References
[1] R. L. Akers, "Rational choice, deterrence, and
social learning theory in criminology: The path not
taken", J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 81, 1990, pp. 653.
[2] J. M. Boldero and E. T. Higgins, "Regulatory focus
and political decision making: When people favor
reform over the status quo", Political Psychology,
32(3), 2011, pp. 399-418.
[3] S. R. Boss, L. J. Kirsch, I. Angermeier, R. A.
Shingler and R. W. Boss, "If someone is watching, I'll
do what I'm asked: Mandatoriness, control, and
information security", European Journal of
Information Systems, 18(2), 2009, pp. 151-164.
[4] B. Bulgurcu, H. Cavusoglu and I. Benbasat,
"Information security policy compliance: An
empirical study of rationality-based beliefs and
information security awareness", MIS Quarterly,
34(4), 2010, pp. 523-548.
[5] A. J. Burns, C. Posey and T. L. Roberts, "Insiders’
Adaptations to Security-Based Demands in the
Workplace: An Examination of Security Behavioral
Complexity", Information Systems Frontiers, 2019.
[6] A. J. Burns, C. Posey, T. L. Roberts and P. B.
Lowry, "Examining the relationship of organizational
insiders' psychological capital with information
security threat and coping appraisals", Computers in
Human Behavior(68), 2017, pp. 190-209.
[7] A. J. Burns, T. L. Roberts, C. Posey, R. J. Bennett
and J. F. Courtney, "Intentions to comply versus
intentions to protect: A VIE theory approach to
understanding the influence of insiders’ awareness of
organizational SETA efforts", Decision Sciences,
49(6), 2018, pp. 1187-1228.
[8] A. J. Burns, T. L. Roberts, C. Posey and P. B.
Lowry, "The Adaptive Roles of Positive and Negative
Emotions in Organizational Insiders’ Security-Based
Precaution Taking", Information Systems Research,
30(4), 2019, pp. 1228-1247.
[9] C. S. Carver and M. F. Scheier, "Control theory: A
useful conceptual framework for personality–social,
clinical, and health psychology", Psychological
Bulletin, 92(1), 1982, pp. 111-135.
[10] Y. Chen, K. Ramamurthy and K.-W. Wen,
"Organizations'
information
security
policy
aompliance: Stick or carrot approach?", Journal of
Management Information Systems, 29(3), 2012, pp.
157-188.
[11] M. S. Choi and A. Durcikova, "Are Printed
Documents Becoming Irrelevant? The Role of
Perceived Usefulness of Knowledge Repositories in
Selecting
From
Knowledge
Sources",
Communications of the Association for Information
Systems, 34(1), 2014, pp. 751-773.

[12] R. E. Crossler, A. C. Johnston, P. B. Lowry, Q.
Hu, M. Warkentin and R. Baskerville, "Future
directions for behavioral information security
research", Computers & Security, 32, 2013, pp. 90101.
[13] J. D'Arcy and T. Herath, "A review and analysis
of deterrence theory in the IS security literature:
making sense of the disparate findings", European
Journal of Information Systems, 20(6), 2011, pp. 643658.
[14] J. D'Arcy, T. Herath and M. Shoss,
"Understanding employee responses to stressful
information security requirements: A coping
perspective", Journal of Management Information
Systems, 31(2), 2014, pp. 285-318.
[15] J. D'Arcy, A. Hovav and D. Galletta, "User
awareness of security countermeasures and its impact
on information systems misuse: A deterrence
approach", Information Systems Research, 20(1),
2009, pp. 79-98.
[16] G. Dhillon and J. Backhouse, "Current directions
in IS security research: Towards socio‐organizational
perspectives", Information Systems Journal, 11(2),
2001, pp. 127-153.
[17] S. L. Green, "Rational Choice Theory: An
Overview", Baylor University Faculty Development
Seminar on Rational Choice Theory, 2002.
[18] J. F. Hair, G. T. M. Hult, C. M. Ringle and M.
Sarstedt, A Primer on Partial Least Squares Structural
Equations Modeling (PLS-SEM), Sage, Los Angeles,
California, 2014.
[19] E. T. Higgins, "Beyond pleasure and pain",
American psychologist, 52(12), 1997, pp. 1280.
[20] E. T. Higgins, R. S. Friedman, R. E. Harlow, L.
C. Idson, O. N. Ayduk and A. Taylor, "Achievement
orientations from subjective histories of success:
Promotion pride versus prevention pride", European
Journal of Social Psychology, 31(1), 2001, pp. 3-23.
[21] Huigang Liang, Yajiong Xue, Alain Pinsonneault
and Y. A. Wu, "What Users Do Besides ProblemFocused Coping When Facing IT Security Threats: An
Emotion-Focused Coping Perspective ", MIS
Quarterly, 43(2), 2019, pp. 373-394.
[22] R. E. Johnson, C.-H. Chang and L.-Q. Yang,
"Commitment and motivation at work: The relevance
of employee identity and regulatory focus", Academy
of management review, 35(2), 2010, pp. 226-245.
[23] R. E. Johnson, D. D. King, S.-H. Lin, B. A. Scott,
E. M. Jackson Walker and M. Wang, "Regulatory
focus trickle-down: How leader regulatory focus and
behavior shape follower regulatory focus",
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 140, 2017, pp. 29-45.

Page 5236

[24] A. C. Johnston and M. Warkentin, "Fear appeals
and information security behaviors: An empirical
study", MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 2010, pp. 549-566.
[25] A. C. Johnston, M. Warkentin and M. Siponen,
"An enhanced fear appeal rhetorical framework:
Leveraging threats to the human asset through
sanctioning rhetoric", MIS Quarterly, 39(1), 2015, pp.
113-134.
[26] A. C. Johnston and M. E. Warkentin, "Fear
appeals and information security behaviors: An
empirical study", MIS Quarterly, 34(2), 2010, pp. 549566.
[27] M. Karjalainen, S. Sarker and M. Siponen,
"Toward a Theory of Information Systems Security
Behaviors of Organizational Employees: A Dialectical
Process Perspective", Information Systems Research,
30(2), 2019, pp. 687-704.
[28] K. Lanaj, C.-H. Chang and R. E. Johnson,
"Regulatory focus and work-related outcomes: a
review and meta-analysis", American Psychological
Association, 2012.
[29] D. Laufer and J. M. Jung, "Incorporating
regulatory focus theory in product recall
communications to increase compliance with a
product recall", Public Relations Review, 36(2), 2010,
pp. 147-151.
[30] H. Liang, Y. Xue and L. Wu, "Ensuring
employees' it compliance: Carrot or stick?",
Information Systems Research, 24(2), 2013, pp. 279294.
[31] P. Lockwood, C. H. Jordan and Z. Kunda,
"Motivation by positive or negative role models:
regulatory focus determines who will best inspire us",
Journal of personality and social psychology, 83(4),
2002, pp. 854.
[32] P. B. Lowry, T. Dinev and R. Willison, "Why
security and privacy research lies at the centre of the
information systems (IS) artefact: proposing a bold
research agenda", European Journal of Information
Systems, 26(6), 2017, pp. 546-563.
[33] P. B. Lowry and J. Gaskin, "Partial least squares
(PLS) structural equation modeling (SEM) for
building and testing behavioral causal theory: When to
choose it and how to use it", IEEE Transactions on
Professional Communication, 57(2), 2014, pp. 123146.
[34] D. P. MacKinnon, Introduction to Statistical
Mediation Analysis, Erlbaum, New York, NY, 2008.
[35] D. P. MacKinnon, C. M. Lockwood and J.
Williams, "Confidence Limits for the Indirect Effect:
Distribution of the Product and Resampling Methods",
Multivariate behavioral research, 39(1), 2004, pp. 9999.
[36] G. D. Moody, M. Siponen and S. Pahnila,
"Toward a unified model of information security

policy compliance", MIS Quarterly, 42(1), 2018, pp.
285-311.
[37] C. Posey, T. L. Roberts and P. B. Lowry, "The
impact of organizational commitment on insiders’
motivation to protect organizational information
assets", Journal of Management Information Systems,
32(4), 2015, pp. 179-214.
[38] C. Posey, T. L. Roberts, P. B. Lowry, R. J.
Bennett and J. F. Courtney, "Insiders’ protection of
organizational information assets: Development of a
systematics-based taxonomy and theory of diversity
for protection-motivated behaviors", MIS Quarterly,
37(4), 2013, pp. 1189-1210.
[39] S. Ransbotham and S. Mitra, "Choice and chance:
A conceptual model of paths to information security
compromise", Information Systems Research, 20(1),
2009, pp. 121-139.
[40] C. M. Ringle, S. Wende and J.-M. Becker,
"SmartPLS3. Bönningstedt: SmartPLS
", 2015.
[41] A. A. Scholer, X. Zou, K. Fujita, S. J. Stroessner
and E. T. Higgins, "When risk seeking becomes a
motivational necessity", Journal of personality and
social psychology, 99(2), 2010, pp. 215.
[42] S. Schuetz, P. Lowry, D. Pienta and J. Thatcher,
"The effectiveness of abstract versus concrete fear
appeals in information security", Journal of
Management Information Systems, 2020, 2020, pp.
forthcoming.
[43] M. Siponen and A. Vance, "Neutralization: New
insights into the problem of employee information
systems security policy violations", MIS Quarterly,
34(3), 2010, pp. 487-502.
[44] D. W. Straub, "Effective IS security", Information
Systems Research, 1(3), 1990, pp. 255-276.
[45] D. W. Straub, M. C. Boudreau and D. Gefen,
"Validation guidelines for IS positivist research",
Communications of the Association for Information
Systems, 13(1), 2004, pp. 380-427.
[46] A. Vance, P. B. Lowry and D. Eggett, "A new
approach to the problem of access policy violations:
Increasing perceptions of accountability through the
user interface", MIS Quarterly, 39(2), 2015, pp. 345366.
[47] A. Vance and M. Siponen, "IS security policy
violations: A rational choice perspective", Journal of
Organizational and End-User Computing, 24(1), 2012,
pp. 21-41.
[48] R. Willison and M. Warkentin, "Beyond
deterrence: An expanded view of employee computer
abuse", MIS Quarterly, 37(1), 2013, pp. 1-20.

Page 5237

